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Abstract
Companies are under an increasing pressure by policy makers to publicize data breaches.
Such notification obligations require announcing the loss of personal data collected from
customers, because of hacker attacks or other incidents. While notification is likely to
impact on firms’ reputation, we know little about the impact such notifications have on
consumers with respect to disclosure of their personal data. We present the problem as a
dynamic lottery with personal data under the risk of privacy shocks and experimentally
study how the privacy breach notification changes an individual’s behavior regarding data
disclosure. Our results suggest that the notification induces individuals – disregarding the
sensitivity of their data – to disclose more.
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1 Introduction
Companies collect an increasing amount of personal data on consumers, which arises as by-
product in economic transactions. Personal details encompass payment behavior, preferences
and lifestyle and are used for marketing purposes or risk assessment. Although many com-
panies display privacy policies, data security remains imperfect and little is known about in-
dividuals’ risk perceptions and trade-offs with respect to personal data. Privacy breaches are
now reported on almost a daily basis. A report published in 2009 quoted a staggering num-
ber of 285 million consumer profiles compromised in 2008 in the financial and other indus-
tries (Verizon (2009)). Breaches range from stolen credit card or account numbers (Volks- and
Raiffeisen-Banks and PostBank in Germany) to mobile phone numbers (T-mobile) or personal
data posted on social networks (100 million FaceBook profiles stolen in 2010). Yet, individuals
seem to not take the risk of a potential privacy breach into account when disclosing informa-
tion. Under these circumstances, firms are under increasing pressure by policymakers to
disclose data breaches that have occurred due to hacker attacks or other improper handling
of personal information. Such notification obligations are creating a risk to company reputa-
tion, as they expose poor security practices. They also increase the costs of data collections
for firms due to possible litigation and class action and increase costs of security bureaucracy,
as consumers have to be notified about potential breaches. These costs aside, there are di-
rect costs of data breaches that firms have to cover.1 Since 2002, data breach notification
laws have been enacted in an increasing number of states, of which some (such as California)
consider an expansion of obligations.2 In the U.S., there is a heated debate, whether such
notifications are necessary and reach their intended effect. Critics argue that notification
obligations might impose unnecessary costs for both firms and consumers (see Romanosky
et al. (2010)). For example, when the harm is low, unnecessary notification may desensitize
individuals, preventing them from acting when a serious threat exists. An increasing number
of notifications lead consumers to become numb: “Notification letters are being sent so fre-
quently, consumers are almost becoming immune to the daily announcements that personal
information has been breached” (Kobus (2011)).3 In Europe, the European Commission intro-
duced with the E-privacy Directive a notification obligation for telecom and Internet Service
Providers in 2009. Firms have to notify individuals about security breaches, if the breach
could adversely affect them by resulting in identity theft, fraud, physical harm, humiliation
1A study in the U.S. puts the organizational costs of data breaches at about USD 5.5 million, see 2011 Cost of Data
Breach Study: United States, see Press Release, https://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.
jsp?prid=20120320_02
2A list is provided here: State Data Breach Notification Laws, http://www.scottandscottllp.com/
resources/state_data_breach_notification_law.pdf
3There is also an expert discussion on the effectiveness presented in Wired, http://www.wired.com/
threatlevel/2009/03/experts-debate/
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or damage to reputation. The latter is interesting insofar as the psychological impact of pri-
vacy breaches are explicitly mentioned. It is now discussed at the EU level to expand the
scope to all sectors (including financial services). A recent report by the European Network
and Information Security Agency (ENISA (2011)) discusses the situation in Europe and gives
examples such as Germany, United Kingdom or Spain that have introduced data breach no-
tifications in their legislations.
This context motivates our research: Our main objective is to investigate how data breach
notifications affect an individual’s transaction behavior with respect to sensitive personal
data. To the knowledge of the authors, there are no experimental studies in this area, espe-
cially, where personal data are affected. Therefore, our main contribution is to provide basic
insights into the interaction of breach notification and individual disclosure behavior.
We present the problem as a dynamic lottery with personal information for which we
synthetically generate sensitive personal data in the laboratory in form of the results of a
logic test, which is similar to an intelligence test. The test result is connected to the real
name of the participant. Thus, we intentionally introduce identification in order to create
personal information. Identification of the individual creates the privacy concern, which does
not exist if aliases are used. In our context, test results constitute sensitive information,
because participants receive a dichotomous private signal of their type that is whether their
test result is above or below the median of the group. Participants (i.e. “consumers”) can
then trade anonymously with firms or may choose to disclose this information (and identify
themselves) in order to obtain a discount for a voucher sold to them. At the end of each
period, chance determines for each consumer-firm pair if there is a privacy breach at the
firm, meaning that the information of the consumer (name and test result) are potentially in
danger to be revealed to the other participants at the end of the experiment. At the end of the
experiment, chance will once again determine, whether there is privacy shock and therefore
the revelation of the information to the audience in lab.
Our experiment considers two environments: one in which participants are informed at
the end of each period about the realization (or not) of a privacy breach at the firm they
dealt with (i.e. Notification treatment), and one in which participants are not informed about
privacy breach (i.e. No Notification treatment). Derived from our model, we theoretically
predict that good types (i.e. individuals above the median) will choose to disclose an optimal
number of periods greater than bad types. Theory also predicts that the introduction of a data
breach notification renders no differences between treatments in terms of data disclosure.
This means that notification does not change probabilities with which individuals are ‘hit’ by a
breach and therefore should not affect their behavior. Intuition, however, would suggest that
notification will make consumers more sensitive – due to a salience effect – to the revelation
of their private information, especially bad types will experience a greater impact compared
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to good types.
Our results suggest that even though below-median individuals tend to disclose less per-
sonal information compared to above-medians, an indication for the sensitivity of the infor-
mation, the notification of a privacy breach has not a statistically differential effect with
respect to the type of individuals. In fact, our results suggest a significant reaction (in terms
of disclosing more) for both types of individuals after receiving a privacy breach message. No
significant effects arise from receiving a message that no breach has occurred. A possible
explanation for this behavior is that individuals – contrary to the explained probabilities in
the experiment about which the participants were fully informed – feel their information is
already lost (‘loss fallacy’). Another explanation is that they become numb to the notification
as soon as they received one and as a consequence it does not influence their behavior in the
theoretically expected way. As there is a difference in disclosure behavior between good and
bad types, we cannot say that the personal data synthetically generated in the experiment is
not sensitive and renders notifications are meaningless.
A caveat of our research, which we should state at the outset, is that we cannot use real
financial or health data due to the exposure risks of laboratory participants. For example, par-
ticipants could use compromised credit card data for malign purposes. However, our approach
creates sensitive information in an academic environment. We regard this as basic research
and caution against reading too much into the results from a policy perspective. Our results
are more insightful for firms in aligning their competitive strategies. For example, notifica-
tions raise awareness of consumers with respect to data security issues, they affect trust in
firms and might turn into a competitive disadvantage if there are ongoing security issues in
a firm. However, if consumers are numb to notifications and do not change their disclosure
behavior, no competitive disadvantage would arise.
2 Experimental Analyses of Privacy
Our research is located at the intersection of economics and psychology. It therefore draws
on different literature strands. It is related to experimental economics, because it is the first
work on a dynamic lottery with personal information. In fact persons reveal on a daily basis
their personal data on the Internet and in other contexts, without the knowledge of probabil-
ities with which their information might be compromised. It draws on game theory, because
we use an incentive-compatible mechanism, which ensures truth-telling about personal in-
formation: our participants cannot lie about their name and test result or employ another
strategy such as using aliases. We purposefully introduce identification, as there is no other
way to create personal information linked to the natural identity of a person. Information
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that is not linked to the natural identity will not be personal and not raise privacy concerns.4
In this respect, it is also related to psychology, because of the social comparisons that we
introduce as well as the privacy concerns analyzed.
Traditional experiments are devoted to situations where players act anonymously. Iden-
tification as a structural variable, however, activates emotions such as sympathy or fear and
can therefore change the results predicted by theory (Camerer (2011)). An exploration of
such a change is provided by Frey and Bohnet (1997), where identification is introduced in
one-shot and repeated Dictator and Prisoner’s Dilemma games. In these games identification
has psychologically binding effects without being a constraint though. One-way identifica-
tion in Dictator games results in less zero-sums devoted by the dictator to the receiver than
predicted (Bohnet and Frey (1999)). In a field experiment, Jenni and Loewenstein (1997)
show that people would spent more resources to ‘save’ identified individual victims compared
to a statistical number of unidentified victims, because identification induces sympathy. In
Charness and Gneezy (2008), identity is introduced in Dictator and Ultimatum games, where
in the former a larger share is devoted, but in the latter strategic considerations crowd out
‘identification effects.’ We introduce the act of identification into a dynamic lottery, which is
typically played with anonymous players. The novelty in our research is that persons’ bet is
not money, but with their personal data.
Our research is also related to Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) and Fehr and Schmidt
(1999). In the former article, it is shown that a risky bet with a result due to chance in-
duces more risky behavior, whereas a trust decision entailing the risk of betrayal by a fellow
participant induces less risky behavior. Trust entails additional costs for individuals. This
insight is linked to our experiment, where players are confronted with risky decisions in an
environment of potential privacy shocks subject to chance and not trust. Individuals are
informed about the risk with which their information is compromised.
In Fehr and Schmidt (1999), it is discussed that people might be subject to inequity aver-
sion. The authors show that there are subjects who dislike inequitable outcomes and experi-
ence inequity if they are worse off in material terms than the other players. It is discussed
that there are persons who dislike inequitable outcomes. Inequity is experienced if they are
materially worse off than the other players. We endow our players with private informa-
tion about their type (their performance compared to the group’s median), which renders
them being ‘unequal’ and induces sensitivity about this inequality. Dhar and Wertenbroch
(2010) explain there is a strategic preference for self-signaling, which our participants would
achieve by disclosing information about their type, and there is evidence on the effects that
such signaling has on utility, where self-signaling effects also derive from the context. We use
4This is the difference between personal and private information: personal information can be private or not, but
it is linked to an identity. Private information must not be linked to an identity.
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therefore an academic context (a University laboratory), students and subjects and the result
of a logic test.
Further, our research is also related to salience as discussed in DellaVigna (2009). We
introduce salience and connect it with notification by informing subjects if a breach has oc-
curred or not. Without such notification, there is no salience, as individuals are not informed
about the breach that occurred at the firm.
The aforementioned experiments aside, there is also a rising number of experimental
works on privacy – all of which are one-shot games. We differ from these works by cap-
turing the dynamics in decisions about personal information with a two-period setting and
the cumulative risk associated with personal information being disclosed to multiple firms.
In Huberman et al. (2005) a reverse second price auction is introduced to obtain the private
value for personal information, where they used weight and age of individuals for information
sale. Our work is associated with this paper, as we obtained private valuation of the test
result by implementing a reverse second price auction (for a different set of participants).
From these auctions, we gained the approximate discount participants obtain for information
revelation. In Huberman et al. (2005) the authors show that deviation from the group’s mean
asymmetrically impacts on the price demanded for the information. However, we find that
neither age nor weight are entirely private information, both can be approximately derived
by just looking at a person. There are a number of other papers, which we will not discuss
in greater detail here due to the different methodological approach taken by them (Acquisti
and Grossklags (2005) and Spiekermann et al. (2009)). These works, however, do not use an
incentive-compatible mechanism.
We should mention Acquisti and Grossklags (2007) as their work inspired our research.
The authors explored the gap between willingness-to-sell versus the willingness-to-protect
personal information.5 The authors generate a quiz score and ask their subjects about the
price for which they are willing to sell their data. For those who sold, the information was
announced to the group and individuals could leave the lab. The latter we introduce as well,
but we also differ in several aspects. First, we introduce dynamics as a succession of deci-
sion tasks and we experiment with information of greater sensitivity by explicitly creating
inequality among participants. We also introduce a probability of a privacy breach and a pri-
vacy shock, such that individuals are uncertain about whether information is disclosed at the
end of the experiment.
There are also related field experiments. In Andrade and Weitz (2002) a web-survey is
conducted on how companies may induce self-disclosure by individuals. They show that the
reputation of a company and the display of a privacy policy induces disclosure, whereas the
offer of a reward for the information reduces disclosure. In our experiment, the firms encoun-
5Individuals sell their information for some amount z, but are not willing to protect it for the same amount z.
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tered induce information revelation by providing a discount for the data. In Beresford et al.
(2012), the willingness-to-pay for privacy is explored. Participants were confronted with two
identical stores that differed only in the information requested - where one shop requested
more sensitive information. In the treatment where the prices of the stores were equal, in-
dividuals bought from both equally often, whereas in the treatment were prices differed, all
chose the cheaper store, although it required more information disclosure. In our experi-
ment, one firm is encountered per period, but they all request the same information. John
et al. (2009) online experiments show that more control over the publication of personal data
decreases the individuals’ concerns and increases their willingness to disclose sensitive infor-
mation. This is related insofar as our participants retain total control if they do not disclose
information.
To summarize, we contribute to this literature in several important aspects. First of all,
we introduce the act of identification into a dynamic lottery, which is typically played with
anonymous players. Second, with respect to the other experiments on privacy, we produce
sensitive information inside the laboratory and we explicitly create inequality among subjects
in order to have information of greater sensitivity. More precisely, we endow our players with
private information about their type (their performance compared to the group’s median)
which denotes them as ‘unequal’. Finally, as explained in greater detail in the next section, in
order to study the effect of a notification breach, we introduce a privacy breach and a privacy
shock, such that individuals are uncertain about whether information is disclosed at the end
of the experiment.
3 Personal Data Disclosure: Experimental Challenges
The core of the privacy problem is whether personal information is regarded as sensitive
by the subjects involved, and whether its disclosure generates potentially adverse welfare
effects for individuals or not. The legal definition states that personal information is "any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an iden-
tifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity;" (Article 2(a), European Data Protection Direc-
tive of 1995). Evidence from Singapore, for example, shows that individuals seem to rank, in
terms of sensitivity, credit cards numbers, contact details (telephone) and identification card
numbers over employment, nationality and religion (Hui (2006)).
We decided to create information that is sensitive in the context of a university and stu-
dents, and that cannot be used to materially damage the participants. In other contexts the
information needed for sensitivity would differ, for example, in finance it would be credit card
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numbers. More specifically, we decided to produce information in the form a result of a test
score. Other researchers have implemented IQ tests in the laboratory as well (see Ariely and
Norton (2005)).6 This choice has several advantages. First of all, with this set-up we avoid
working with data in the laboratory, which can be used outside of the laboratory for malign
purposes. In addition, we can confront individuals in a dynamic lottery with the trade-offs of
revealing their private information. This lottery differs from traditional ones where individ-
uals can lose money, because our players can only lose private information when the infor-
mation is leaked to “the public”. Finally, as our experiment aims to capture the interaction
between a primary transaction (on a market for a generic good) and the secondary transac-
tion entailing a consumer’s information, we let the students play this lottery, and trade this
information, with computerized firms in the lab.7
Before presenting the experimental design in detail, however, two concepts must be de-
fined: privacy breach and privacy shock.
Definition 1 A privacy breach occurs when private and personal information stored in a
firm is compromised, which may subsequently either be disclosed to the public or not.
There are different origins of privacy breaches, which are attributable to human processes
or system failures. Examples are security leaks, employee fraud or hacker attacks. A breach
that occurred in a firm is not always disclosed to the public by the firm. It must be disclosed,
however, if there is a legal notification obligation (the so-called data breach notification).
Definition 2 A privacy shock is a sudden (unexpected) change in the distribution of private
and personal information among market participants. In such a situation, information is
revealed to third parties or otherwise used without the consent of the subject.
In our setting, a privacy breach occurs when a firm is attacked during one of the transac-
tion periods. This does not automatically mean personal data collected by the firm is disclosed
to the public. However, in the case where it is disclosed to the public, i.e. to other participants
in the experiment, we speak about a ‘privacy shock.’ The event of a shock is generated by the
co-incidence of a breach plus a random draw of a specific period at the end of the experiment.
This will be discussed in greater detail below.
6It must be noted that we do not work with a full-scale IQ test. These tests last more than an hour and the IQ
results need to be calculated in a way related to the peer group. Therefore, we used only some questions from an IQ
test and called explained to participants that they would encounter a logic test with questions similar to an IQ test.
7In our experiment, firms are not playing any decisive role in terms of choice to be made. We thus decided to use
computerized firms, which do not involve trust issues. Moreover, involving humans on the other side of the market
would have also given rise to tricky problems under the German data protection law, which we discussed with the
Data Protection Officer in charge.
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4 Experimental Design and Theoretical Predictions
In order to study the effect of a breach notification on the disclosure behaviour of individuals,
we consider two treatments: one with Notification and one No Notification. In the treatment
with notification participants are informed at the end of each period whether a privacy breach
occurred or not at the firm they were dealing with, whereas in the treatment without noti-
fication participants do not receive any kind of message after they dealt with firms. In the
following we explain more in detail the timing and the design of our experiment, along with
a discussion on the theoretical predictions.
4.1 The Timing
In both treatments, at time 0, participants (i.e. consumers) undertake an incentivized logic
test. They are then informed about the result of their test and how they performed compared
to their peers. More specifically, they are privately informed on whether their score is above
or below the median result of the group of participants in the experimental session. In period
1 and 2, participants take over the role of a consumer who encounters one (computerized)
firm per period.8 Firms sell a homogeneous good at price P, which is represented in this
experiment by a voucher to be spent in a big store offering a wide range of DVDs, books, and
CDs. Consumers have the option of selling their private information to the firm in order to
obtain a discount d on the price of the voucher, to buy the voucher at full price, or to simply
refuse any deals with the firm. Therefore, as long as the consumer does not disclose the
information to any firms, the information remains private. The value of the discount, d, has
been determined through several privacy auctions. These where reverse Vickrey auctions run
with different participants, who could sell their information for a low ask price. We conducted
these auctions to calibrate the discount. We additionally assume that the cost of disclosing
the private information is equal to zero, even though consumers might have positive costs
when disclosing information to a firm.9
At the end of the game, in both treatments, a privacy shock might realize for the consumer.
In the lab, this shock is represented by the revelation of the information to the other partici-
pants in the session. A precondition for a privacy shock to occur at the end of the experiment
is the realization of a privacy breach at the firm either in period 1 or 2. Thus, as already
highlighted above, the difference between privacy breach and privacy shock is important in
our context:
• Privacy Breach. There is a constant probability pi in each period that data security
8Computerized firms are appropriate for the scope of the current experiment since our aim is to study consumers’
behaviour in reaction of a breach notification.
9Consumers have positive costs related to disclosure when making an effort to type information into lengthy forms
on a website, for example. Our forms were rather short.
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in a firm is breached and (1 − pi) that it is not breached. Even in the case where a con-
sumer has sold his information, a privacy breach does not automatically lead to public
disclosure of personal information (i.e. the privacy shock at the end).
• Privacy Shock. If a privacy breach occurs either in period 1 or 2, affected consumers
will have the result of their test result revealed at the end of the experiment if and only
if a random draw coincides with the period(s) in which consumers disclosed information.
More precisely, such a shock only occurs in the co-incidence of the following events: the
consumer has sold information either in period 1 or 2, in that very period a breach
realized at the firm, and exactly that period is drawn at the end of the experiment.
Finally, the notification about the realization – or not – of the privacy breach only occurs in
the treatment with notification.
To summarize, the timing of our experiment is
1. The test is undertaken at time 0. Participants are privately informed whether their
score is above or below the median of the group.
2. In the first period, subjects can buy a voucher and sell their private information (i.e.
their name and the test result) for a discount d. A privacy breach may occur with
probability pi (independent probability between subjects and periods). In the treatment
Notification, participants are also informed whether a breach realized or not at the firm
they dealt with.
3. In the second period, subjects can again buy a good and sell their private information
for a discount d. A privacy breach may occur with probability pi. In the treatment
Notification, participants are once again informed whether a breach realized or not at
the firm they dealt with.
4. At the end, a privacy shock may occur: for each subject, one period (1 or 2) is chosen at
random (independently). If in the chosen period a privacy breach occurred, and the indi-
vidual sold the private information, a privacy shock realizes: the personal information
(i.e. the name and the test result) are revealed to the others.
4.2 Consumer Utility
Let τi ∈ {vi,bad, vi,good}, where vi,bad ≤ vi,good, be the value that the subject denoted by i
attaches to the evaluation of his ability (in the test) by the others. That is, vi,bad(vi,good) is
the value that he adds to his utility when others believe that his test was below (above) the
median. In the following we consider the case where vi,bad = −vi,good = 1. By abuse of notation
we denote by τi the type of the subject (-1 means that his test was below the median).
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Let si,j ∈ [0, 1] be the probability by which subject i will sell or not the private information
in period j. By si,j = {si,1, si,2} we denote the strategy of individual i, by s−i the set of
strategies of all subjects different from i and by s the profile of strategy of all subjects. Let
bi = bi(s) denote the subject i’s second order beliefs about her type (b is the probability that
τi = 1). Beliefs are correct (rational) (Note, the value of b depends on the strategy chosen by
all subjects).
Let βi ≥ 0 be a sensitivity parameter (of subject i) about the revelation of the private
information and γi ≥ 0 be a sensitivity parameter (of subject i) applied to the second order
beliefs (i.e. beliefs on the beliefs that others have on the subject i).
Let Ui(si,s−i, τi) be the individual i’s expected utility that depends on his strategy and the
strategies used by others, then:
• Ui(0, 0, s−i, τi) = γibi − γi(1− bi)
• Ui(1, 0, s−i, τi) = Ui(0, 1, s−i, τi) = d+ p1βiτi + (1− p1)(γibi − γi(1− bi))
• Ui(1, 1, s−i, τi) = 2d+ p2βiτi + (1− p2)(γibi − γi(1− bi))
where p1is the probability of a privacy shock when the subject discloses the information only
in one period, and p2 is the probability of a privacy shock when the subject discloses the infor-
mation in both periods. By denoting with si{x1, x2}a strategy where x1,x2are the probabilities
to sell the private information in period 1, the probability of a privacy shock is given by
p(x1,x2) = ((1− x1)x2 + (1− x2)x1)pi2 + pix1x2
Hence, it directly follows that, when the subject sells the private information only in one
period, the probability of a privacy shock is:
p1 = pi2
and when the subject sells the private information in both periods the probability of a
privacy shock is:
p2 = pi
4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
Now consider the simplest case where βi = γi = β.
4.3.1 Treatment No Notification
In the treatment without notification, participants above the median (i.e. good types, τi =
1) will always disclose their information, whereas participants below the median (τi = −1)
behave according to the following proposition:
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Proposition (Equilibrium 1). It exists a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium where si = {1, 1}for
all i with τi = 1. For all i with τi = −1
(a) Never disclose if piβ 1−pi2−pi ≥ d, si = {0, 0}
(b) Always disclose if if β pi2 < d, si = {1, 1}
(c) Mix if piβ 1−pi2−pi < d < β
pi
2 , si = {x1, x2} when d = β pi2 2−2pi2−pi−p(x1,x2)
Proof. See Appendix.
4.3.2 Treatment with Notification
Participants in this treatment receive a message at the end of each period, which notifies
them about the realization of a breach at the firm they dealt with. They can receive two
types of message: ‘A privacy breach has occurred’ in case the firm has been attacked, and the
message ‘No privacy breach has occurred’. The presence of notifcation causes a larger set of
strategies, because individuals can condition their action in the second period on the message
they received. But this has no effect on the equilibrium actions because the probability to
have the information (eventually) disclosed in the second period is independent from the
realization in the first period of the privacy breach.
Proposition (Equilibrium 2).
With notification the equilibrium strategies are the same to those described in proposition
1.
Proof. See Appendix.
5 Experimental Results
The experiment was run between June and August 2012 at the Laboratory Technical Univer-
sity of Berlin, using z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007)), and involving 228 participants for
a total of 13 sessions. The average payoff was about 6 Euro in cash and 4 Euro in vouchers.
Each session lasted for about one hour and did not start until all participants were familiar
with the procedure. To ensure familiarity, we asked participants to solve various exercises.
We conducted the experiment for two environments (i.e., treatments Notification and No
Notification). As explained above, in the treatment Notification, participants were informed
about a privacy breach happened or not at the firms they dealt with, whereas in treatment No
Notification, participants did not receive such a message.10 However, in both treatments, at
the end of the experiment, participants who sold their information to a firm, may experience
a privacy shock, i.e. the revelation of the information to the other participants.
10A translation of the German instructions is available upon request.
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5.1 Univariate Analysis
We are interested in studying the effect of the notification of a data breach on the disclosure
behaviour of an individual. Thus, we focus on the number of periods individuals sold their
data to a firm, during the experimental sessions. We identify: individuals who always dis-
closed their information, by means of a dummy variable (“Always Disclosed”) equal to one if
the participant sold the information to the firm in both periods of the game; individuals who
never disclosed their information, by means of a dummy variable (“Never Disclosed”) equal to
one if the participant never sold the information during the experiment, and individuals who
disclosed the information only once, by means of a dummy variable (“Disclosed Once”) equal
to one if the participant sold the information in one out of the two periods of the game. To see
whether there is an effect, we first compare across treatments (i.e. with and without the no-
tification message) the mean values of these dummy variables computed by keeping for each
session their respective session averages. The results from these unpaired tests (in-between
treatment comparisons subjects are not used as their own control) are reported in Table (2).
The null hypothesis is that the two groups are drawn from two populations with the same
mean (TTEST), median, and distribution (MANN-WITHNEY). In line with the theoretical
predictions, all these tests seem to suggest that there is no treatment effect of the data noti-
fication breach, as all of them suggest to accept the null hypothesis. Similar conclusions are
reached when comparing the results across individual types (not reported). However, when
we compare these variables within the treatment sessions, distinguishing between the two
types of message a subject received during the experiment (i.e. “A breach has occurred” and
“No breach has occurred”), a strong and significant effect arises. Specifically, within treat-
ments, we observe a highly and significant share of individuals who always disclosed the
information after receiving the message that a breach has occurred.
5.2 Multivariate Analysis
To check the robustness of the previous results we perform a multivariate analysis that allows
us to control for specific characteristics of individuals. We rely on an ordinal logit specification
in which the dependent variable “Disclose” considers all the possibilities of information disclo-
sure during the experiment, ranging from “Never Disclosed” to “Always Disclosed”. In other
words, we observe an individual disclosing k times the information (with k = 0, 1, 2) when-
ever the hypothetical number of times the participant is willing to disclose (the unobservable
latent variable “Disclose∗”) does not pass a specific threshold c. In formula,
Pr(Disclose = k )= Pr(ck < Disclose∗ ≤ ck+1,)=Pr(ck < x′iβ + ui ≤ ck+1,)=
=Pr(ck − x′iβ < ui ≤ ck+1, − x′iβ)=F(ck+1 − x′iβ)-F(ck − x′iβ)
where u is logistic distributed with F(z)= ez/(1 + ez), the thresholds are assumed to be
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strictly increasing (ck < ck+1∀k), and c1 = −∞ and ck+1 =∞.
The main specification includes the following variables among the regressors:
β′ix = β1Below+β2BreachMessage+β12Below∗BreachMessage+β3NoBreachMessage+
β13No BreachMessage ∗Below
where Below is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual’s results in the logic
test was below the median and zero otherwise, Breach Message is a dummy variable equal
one if the individual received the message “A breach has occurred” and zero otherwise, and
No Breach Message is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual received the message
“No breach has occurred” and zero otherwise. A full description of the other variables used in
the analysis along with the main statistics is provided in Table (1).
The results for the estimated model are reported in Table (3), whereas the average of the
marginal effects for the outcome “Always Disclosed” are reported in Table (4). The model is
non-linear, therefore coefficients on the interaction terms (i.e. how the effect of one variable
changes when the other variable in the interaction term changes), β12 and β13, do not provide
the change in the partial effect of the variables on the conditional mean function and care
needs to be taken in the interpretation of the results (Ai and Norton (2003), Greene (2010),
Karaca-Mandic et al. (2011)). In addition, in some cases, the results of hypothesis tests are
an artifact of the functional form and do not necessarily have an economically meaningful
content (Greene (2010)). Therefore, we report in Table (5) the estimated interaction effects,
as well as marginal effects for specific groups.
In column (a) we start by adding as explanatory variables the dummy variable Below,
which equals to one for those individuals whose performance in the logic test was below the
median, and the dummy variable Breach Message, which is equal to one for those individuals
who received, at the end of the first period, a message “A breach has occurred”. As expected,
individuals who were below the median tend to disclose less compared to individuals whose
performance was above the median. This in fact accentuates that the information generated
through the logic test is considered sensitive by those who scored below the median. To
interpret these coefficients more easily (as well as the interaction terms) we can exponentiate
them (Buis (2010)). The exponentiated coefficients (odds ratio) give the ratio by which the
dependent variable changes for a unit change in an explanatory variable, that is: the effect of
a unit increase of the independent variable on the probability of disclosing a higher number
of times, while holding the other variables in the model constant. If the odds are greater than
one disclosing the information is more likely to happen than not. If the odds are less than
one then disclosing a higher number of times is less likely to happen. Related to the group of
participants who were below the median, we expect to find 35% of participants who always
disclose as we observe an odds ratio of 0.35 (i.e., exp(-1.062)). Similarly, we expected an odds
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ratio that is 8.26 times higher among the participants who received the message “A breach
has occurred”. These results are robust across all specifications from columns (b) to (l) in
which we progressively add various controls.
At this stage, it is important to underline that the ordinal logit makes a “parallel odds”
assumption. That is, it assumes that only the cut-off parameters ck is different across the
changes in the number of periods participants disclose the information, whereas the slope
coefficients of the link function (i.e. the parameters of interest) remain identical. This as-
sumption may be inappropriate but can be tested through a likelihood ratio test. The results
from this test supports the proportional odds assumption.
In column (b) we introduce the interaction term of the dummies Below and Breach Message
to disentangle the effect of the message between the two types of participants (i.e. below or
above the median). The interaction term is negative but not significant. The odds ratio is
in this case 0.239 (i.e. exp(-1.432)), which means that the effect of the Breach Message on
the number of periods, where below-median participants disclosed the information, is 0.239
times the effect of receiving such a message for above-median individuals. This effect is also
clear in Table (5), where we report the average of marginal effects for different groups. In
particular, we observe that the average marginal effects (i.e. the change in the probability
of disclosing the information in a higher number of periods) after receiving the message “A
breach has occurred” is higher for above-median participants in comparisons to below-median
individuals (0.457 vs 0.311). However, the difference between the two groups (i.e. a difference-
in-differences test), which is equal to the difference in the average of marginal effects (-0.143),
and represents the interaction term, is not significant. This result, and the magnitude of
these parameters, remains robust across the specifications from columns (b) to (l). We can
thus conclude that, after receiving the message that a breach has occurred, individuals who
performed poorly in the logic test will tend to disclose less than individuals who performed
well, although this result is not statistically significant.
To disentangle the effect of the two types of messages the individuals received during the
treatment sessions, we introduce in column (c) the dummy variable No Breach Message, which
is equal to one for those individuals who received at the end of the of the first period the mes-
sage “No breach has occurred”. The coefficient on this variable is negative and individually
not significant, meaning that individuals receiving a message “No breach has occurred” tend
to disclose less. In this case, we expect an odds ratio of disclosing the information that is 0.80
times lower among the participants who received the message “No breach has occurred”. The
combined effect of this variable with the dummy Breach Message, which basically captures
our treatment effect, is jointly significant at 5% level in all specifications but the last one (l),
in which we include a dummy variable for each experimental session. However, when we look
at the average across all individuals of marginal effects in Table (5), for both groups of par-
15
ticipants, we can conclude that the effect of this second type of message is never statistically
significant.
We also explore for this type of message whether there is a different impact depending on
the two types of individuals, by adding in column (d) an interaction term of the dummy vari-
able Below with the dummy variable No Breach Message. In this case, the interaction term
is negative. This means that below-median participants tended to disclose less compared to
above-median participants, even after receiving this message. A reason could be that the
No Breach Message primes them (once more after reading the instructions) on breaches that
could occur. However in no cases, from columns (d) to (l), the differential effect of No Breach
Message turned out to be significant.
From column (e) on, we start to add control variables which we collected at the end through
a questionnaire at the of each experimental session. In column (e) we introduce a variable
measuring the number of subjects known by each participant in the experimental session.
We expected that the higher the number, the higher the privacy concern of participants, and
therefore the lower the willingness to disclose the information. This result remains robust
(i.e. about a 10% decrease in the probability of disclosing, see again Table (5)) and significant
at 10% level across the various specification. In column (f ) we include a variable that mea-
sures the privacy attitude of the participant relying on the well-known classification proposed
in the past by Westin (Kumaraguru and Cranor (2005)), which distinguishes among ‘pri-
vacy fundamentalists’, ‘privacy pragmatists’ and ‘privacy unconcerned’. This variable turns
never out as significant. Results are substantially similar when we replace this variable with
the traditional measure of risk aversion in unreported regressions (available upon request).
These were derived from an incentivized lottery at the beginning of each experimental ses-
sion. In a companion paper (Jentzsch and Giannetti (2012)), the Westin privacy types and
the risk aversion turn out to be highly correlated. In column (g) we also include individual
characteristics such as Age, Height, and sex (i.e. Female, a dummy variable equal to one for
female), which are exogenous to our dependent variable. There is evidence that, in line with
the experimental studies on risk aversion, individuals who are older tend to be less willing
to take risks, reflected in disclosing less personal data. The overall effect of this group of
variables, however, is not jointly significant. We include in column (h) dummy variables ac-
counting for the level of education of participants’ parents. The base category is a dummy
variable equal to one if both parents have an Abitur (comparable to High-school diploma in
the U.S.). These dummy variables are never significant, either alone or jointly. In column (i),
we additionally include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individuals never accept cookies
when using their computer.11 Also in this case, this variable is significant, although only
11Cookie preferences map the individual’s acceptance of being tracked on the Internet, which is related to privacy
preferences.
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at 10% level. Finally, in column (l) we include session dummies to the full specification in
column (i). The results are robust to this last control.
We conclude that even though below-median individuals tend to disclose less personally
sensitive data, the breach notification has no statistically differential effect with respect to
the type of individual. This is in line with the decision model presented herein if the dis-
count is large enough to compensate below-median individuals. In addition, we can observe
a significant rise in disclosure for both types of individuals after receiving the message that a
privacy breach happened. This is an unexpected result, which is rather surprising. Intuition
would hold that bad types disclose less after receiving the message due to the salience effect.
No significant effect arises from receiving a message that no breach has occurred, though.
6 Conclusions
We investigate the effect of a breach notification on consumer behavior with respect to dis-
closing personal data to firms in an economic transaction. We admit that our experiment is
stylized, but a more real setting with financial information or health information was not
feasible under the circumstances that we were eager to produce real personal data connected
to the natural identity of the person in the laboratory. We have two key results. The first
is in line with our expectations. Individuals that pass a social comparison with negative re-
sult tend to disclose this information a lower number of times compared to their peers. The
second is that once individuals receive a breach notification, they tend to disclose more. This
is an unexpected result, but in line with observations in the real world. Breach notifications
do not drive consumers in masses away from firms. They seem to not reduce identity theft
and they rarely result in such theft. It also seems that consumers ignore these notification
messages. Consumers who do not change their behavior in the expected way do not disci-
pline companies that are negligent with their personal data. If persons become increasingly
numb to notifications, no competitive disadvantage from frequent breach notifications arises
for firms – which is at the very core of this policy measure. We are aware that there is no
straight generalization of results gained from an experiment with students and employees at
a Technical University to consumers in general. Therefore, we regard our research more as
qualitative evidence, which needs further backing by field experiments.
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A Appendix
Proof (Equilibrium 1). The result for individuals i with τi = 1directly follows by the con-
sideration that their utility is increasing in the probability of privacy shock. Then si = {1, 1}
is increasing in the probability of privacy shock. Then si = {1, 1}is a dominant strategy.
Case a) the subject i’s second order belief when his private information is not revealed at
the end is:
bi = 1−pi2−pi
Therefore the subject i’s utility can be written as:
• Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi) = β( 1−pi2−pi − 12−pi ) = β( −pi2−pi )
• Ui(1, 0, s¯−i, τi) = Ui(0, 1, s−i, τi) = d− β pi2 + (1− pi2 )β( −pi2−pi )
• Ui(1, 1, s¯−i, τi) = 2d− piβ + (1− pi)β( −pi2−pi )
where s¯−i denote the equibrium strategy of all other subjects.
Equilibrium conditions are:
1. Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi) ≥ Ui(1, 0, s¯−i, τi)
2. Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi) ≥ Ui(0, 1, s¯−i, τi)
3. Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi) ≥ Ui(1, 1, s¯−i, τi)
These conditions are:
β( −pi2−pi ) ≥ d− β pi2 + (1− pi2 )β( −pi2−pi ) (from 1 and 2)
β( −pi2−pi ) ≥ 2d− piβ + (1− pi)β( −pi2−pi ) (from 3)
Using some algebra we get:
piβ 1−pi2−pi ≥ d
piβ 1−pi2−pi ≥ d
Case b) the subject i’s second order belief when his private information is not revealed at
the end is:
bi = 12
Therefore the subject i’s utility can be written as
1. Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi) = 0
2. Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi) = Ui(0, 1, s¯−i, τi) = d− pi2β
3. Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi) = 2d− piβ
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Equilibrium conditions are:
1. Ui(1, 1, s¯−i, τi) ≥ Ui(1, 0, s¯−i, τi)
2. Ui(1, 1, s¯−i, τi) ≥ Ui(0, 1, s¯−i, τi)
3. Ui(1, 1, s¯−i, τi) ≥ Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi)
These conditions are:
2d− piβ ≥ d− pi2β (from 1 and 2 when τi = −1)
2d− piβ ≥ 0 (from 3 when τi = −1)
Using some algebra we get:
d ≥ β pi2
d ≥ β pi2
Case c) the subject i’s second order belief when his private information is not revealed at
the end is:
bi = 1−2pi2−pi−p(x1,x2)
Therefore the subject i’s utility can be written as
1. Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi) = β( s−pi2−pi−p(x1,x2) )
2. Ui(1, 0, s¯−i, τi) = Ui(0, 1, s¯−i, τi) = d− pi2β + (1− pi2 )β( s−pi2−pi−p(x1,x2) )
3. Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi) = 2d− piβ + (1− pi)β( s−pi2−pi−p(x1,x2) )
In equilibrium we have Ui(1, 1, s¯−i, τi) = Ui(1, 0, s¯−i, τi) = Ui(0, 1, s¯−i, τi) = Ui(0, 0, s¯−i, τi).
Replacing the utilities and solving the equalities we get the result.
Proof (Equilibrium 2). We compute the incentive to sell information in the second pe-
riod given a generic strategy (si,1, si,2) and in the case that in period 1 the information was
sold. We consider two cases: a) a privacy breach has occurred and b) no privacy breach has
occurred. By u (1) denote the expected utility deriving from selling the information in period
2 and by u (0)the expected utility deriving from no to sell the info.
Case a). In this case, when the individual receives the message “a privacy breach has
occurred” he know that a privacy shock can happen to the information revealed in period 1
by probability 12 . Then u (1) = 2d − 1+pi2 β + 1−pi2 (2bi − 1)β and u (0) = d − 12β + 12 (2bi − 1)β.
The incentives to sell the information in period 2 are: u (1) − u (0) = d − piβbi. Case b).
In this case, when the individual receives the message “no privacy breach has occurred” he
know that a privacy shock cannot happen to the information revealed in period 1. Then
u (1) = 2d − pi2β + (1 − pi2 )(2bi − 1)β and u (0) = d + (2bi − 1)β. The incentives to sell the
information in period 2 are: u (1) − u (0) = d − piβbi. Then the incentive to sell information
in period two are independent from the type of notification and are equal to the case No
21
Notification. In similar way we find that the incentives to sel information in period 1 are
equal to those in the case No Notification. Directly follows that equilibria are the same to
those on the case No Notification. QED.
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Table 2: AVERAGE RESULTS ACROSS TREATMENTS
Never disclosed is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the subject never disclosed the information during
the experiment, Disclosed Once is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the subject disclosed the information
in one out of two periods during the experiment, and Always Disclosed is defined as a dummy variable equal to
one if the subject always disclosed the information in the two periods of the experiment.
Between Treatment
No Notification Notification TTEST MANN-WITHNEY MEDIAN
Never Disclosed 0.52 0.46 0.227 0.227 0.571
Disclosed Once 0.06 0.09 0.165 0.165 0.286
Always Disclosed 0.42 0.46 0.346 0.346 0.476
Within Treatment
Message Breach Message No Brech TTEST MANN-WITHNEY MEDIAN
Never Disclosed 0 0.58 0.000 0.000 0.000
Disclosed Once 0.17 0.10 0.195 0.388 0.652
Always Disclosed 0.83 0.33 0.000 0.000 0.000
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